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A B S T R A C T   
The spread of misinformation with regards to aviation disasters continues to be a point of concern for aviation 
companies. Much of this information usually surrounds speculation based on the cause and responsibility at-
tributed to the incident, implicitly possessing the potential to generate significant financial market price vola-
tility. In this paper, we investigate a number of stylised facts relating to the effects of airline disasters on aviation 
stocks, while considering contagion effects, information flows and the sources of price discovery within the 
broad sector. Results indicate a substantially elevated levels of share price volatility in the aftermath of aviation 
disasters, while cumulative abnormal returns present sharp under-performance of the analysed companies re-
lative to international exchanges. When considering an EGARCH analysis, we observe that share price volatility 
appears to be significantly influenced by the scale of the disaster in terms of the fatalities generated. Significant 
contagion effects upon the broad aviation index along with substantial changes in traditional price discovery 
channels are also identified. The role that the spread of information on social media, whether it be correct or of 
malicious origins, cannot be eliminated as an explanatory factor of these changing dynamics over time and 
region.   
1. Introduction 
The aviation sector has been exposed to a number of quite unique 
threats in recent years, while further experiencing some exceptionally 
rare events that few other industries must contest. The sector has been 
directly exposed to elevated threats of terrorism, with the most devas-
tating events occurring in the United States in 2001 (Kim & Gu, 2004), 
resulting in widespread industrial reform and increased running costs. 
However, some incidents have been mostly as a result of exception 
unfortunate circumstance. For example, one of the most rare events 
involved that of Malaysia Airlines, who during an unprecedented turn 
of events, lost two commercial airliners within five months in 2014, 
leading to the subsequent nationalisation of the company so that gov-
ernment could protect both the Malaysian tourism industry and attempt 
to ensure the employment of almost twenty thousand employees that 
relied on the company's survival. Kaplanski and Levy (2010) found that 
in the aftermath of a significant negative event effect with an average 
market loss of more than $60 billion per aviation disaster, whereas the 
estimated actual loss is no more than $1 billion, where within two days 
after the event, a price reversal occurs. Understanding the dynamics of 
financial market behaviour and the manner in which investors perceive 
such risk is of the utmost importance for companies who have been 
unfortunate enough to experience such disasters. What is already con-
sidered to be deeply competitive industry generates substantial pres-
sures on aviation companies with little scope allowed for error. Such 
pressures can manifest in exceptional industrial and managerial pres-
sures to perform in line with industry expectations. 
Although airline accidents are infrequent, they can have significant 
effects on an airline's stock price and profitability (Borenstein & 
Zimmerman, 1988; Li, Phun, Suzuki, & Yai, 2015). Chance and Ferris 
(1987) found that the financial impact of an aviation disaster is focused 
solely on the carrier, while the industry as a whole is not affected.  
Noronha and Singal (2004) investigated 783 accidents/incidents of US 
domiciled airlines and found that only about 2–3% were serious enough 
to cause financial pain. They also concluded that the investment bond 
credit rating would change by a whole ‘letter’ change, for example from 
AAA to AA+ as a result of this serious accident. Both Borenstein and 
Zimmerman (1988) together with Mitchell and Maloney (1989) 
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analysed changes in equity value following accidents and found evi-
dence that airlines which experienced fatal accidents were subsequently 
penalised by modest profitability declines. Ho, Qiu, and Tang (2013) 
examined the impact of aviation tragedies on the stock prices of the 
airlines that had encountered a crash together with their rival carriers 
and found that the afflicted airline experienced deeper negative ab-
normal returns as the degree of fatality increases. However, stock prices 
of the rival airlines also suffer in large-scale disasters but benefit 
somewhat from the disasters when the fatality is minor. Walker, 
Thiengtham, and Lin (2005) employed a sample of 138 aviation dis-
asters involving aircraft operated by publicly traded US carriers be-
tween July 1962 and December 2003. The authors observed that air-
lines experience an average stock price drop of 2.8% within one trading 
day after the corresponding news announcement, while aircraft man-
ufacturers experienced a stock price drop of only 0.8% during that time 
period. Similarly, Barrett, Heuson, Kolb, and Schropp (1987) concur by 
calculating that the average market decline for airline stock prices 
within a day of the crash is approximately 1.5%. The magnitude of the 
initial price decline appears to be driven by various characteristics of 
both the firm and the accident itself. It is important to note that some 
research has pointed to sectoral financial difficulty, such as that of Assaf 
(2009) who identified through a technical model that US airlines are 
operating at a declining efficiency rate with an average of 69.02% in 
2007, with results from returns to scale also echoing efficiency results.  
Lee and Jang (2007) found that through an analysis of 16 airline 
companies for the period of 1997–2002, profitability, growth and safety 
are negatively associated with the systematic risk, while the debt 
leverage and firm size are positively related to the risk. This risk has 
been exacerbated somewhat by substantial increases in competition 
over time (Francis, Dennis, Ison, & Humphreys, 2007). 
Research relating to aviation disasters has a number of relevant 
policy implications. Market sensitivity to such sudden, catastrophic 
shocks could be deeply exacerbated by the role of social media and the 
spread of misinformation, or malicious information in the aftermath of 
such events. Much of the spread of such information usually surrounds 
speculation based on the cause and responsibility attributed to the in-
cident. While we must consider that financial markets in recent years 
are guided by a more rapid dissemination of information through the 
development of social media which could be perceived to be of better 
quality through the ease through which pictures and videos are shared 
through which observers can make their own opinion, it should also be 
considered that the presence of such improved efficiency could in fact 
manifest in side-effects such as an ability to profit from the spread of 
false information, not only generating further undue distress on the 
companies and families involved in such tragedy, but also hindering the 
efforts of rescue teams while further inspiring other market participants 
who do not fear current regulatory and policing efforts. 
In this paper, we investigate as to whether a number of stylised facts 
relating to the effects of airline disasters on aviation stocks and con-
tagion effects within the broad sector hold. First, we analyse as to 
whether there exist time-varying and geographical differences in the 
response mechanisms of investors to aviation disasters, or indeed, has 
there been a variation of response that could be considered to be cor-
related to the level of injury and fatality caused by each individual 
incident. Further, we generate further novelty through the inclusion of 
analysis that focused on the interlinkages between the incident com-
panies and the broad aviation sector. Finally, we investigate changes in 
flow of information and price discovery that could be considered to be 
abnormal when considering pre-disaster averages between the stock 
price of incident companies and broad aviation indices that represent 
sectoral returns. 
We first clearly identify that substantially elevated levels of share 
price volatility, however, there is evidence to suggest that this volatility 
has somewhat decreased in the periods 2005 through 2019. Such effects 
are found to be substantial when considering geographical differentials, 
with both North American and South American companies exhibiting 
the largest negative effects. When analysing cumulative abnormal re-
turns (CARs), we observe that there exists sharp under-performance of 
the companies relative to international exchanges throughout each of 
the analysed time periods with the exception of the period between 
2000 and 2004. When considering an EGARCH analysis to investigate 
specific volatility effects, we observe a sharp increase in unconditional 
volatility in the ten-day period after the aviation incident, indicative of 
strong short-term effects. However, while the shock to unconditional 
volatility appears to be immediate, there is evidence to suggest that it 
dissipates and returns to pre-aviation incident levels within sixty days 
after the event. Further, our results indicate that there exists a clear 
positive relationship between the two variables, indicating that the 
estimated EGARCH-volatility appears to be significantly influenced by 
the scale of the disaster in terms of the fatalities generated. When 
considering the contagion effects of volatility and the flow of in-
formation and price discovery between the incident company and the 
broad aviation sector, we find that there were substantial decreased in 
dynamic conditional correlations during incidents that occurred in the 
periods 1995–99, 2000–04 and 2005–09 respectively. 
However,evidence of such pronounced effects do not appear to occur in 
the periods between 2010 and 14 and 2015–19. For every case analysed 
we find that there were substantial decreases in information flow 
identified between the interactions between both the airline and the 
aviation sector. This indicates that there is a permanent disruption to 
the flow of information and price discovery channels that would have 
traditional have existed in the period prior to the aviation disaster. 
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a thorough 
review of the literature relating to the interlinkages between aviation 
disasters and the varying effects on financial markets and sectoral in-
teractions. Section 3 presents a concise overview of the data used in this 
research along with the various methodologies employed to capture 
firm-level volatility, both intra-sectoral and geographic volatility 
transmission, and indeed contagion effects by type of aviation incident.  
Section 4 presents a concise overview of the results presented, while  
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Previous literature 
Although much research focuses specifically on the aviation sector 
in terms of structure and performance, little has focused specifically on 
the presence of sectoral interactions between rival and geographically- 
similar aviation companies. Research of such nature is of substantial 
value to the broad sectoral correlations that exist, enabling theoreti-
cally-plausible avenues through which large aviation incidents could 
generate significant sector-wide risk. While this research sets out to 
investigate the existence of such channels as identified by stock market 
dynamics, it builds on a number of existing research areas. Chance and 
Ferris (1987) found that such incidents were, in the mid-1980s ring- 
fenced from the broad sector at large, however, much research today 
has begun to focus on the dissemination of news through multiple 
technological channels, leading to quite strong theoretical foundations 
to signal that such results might not exist almost three decades later. Ho 
et al. (2013) found that there do exist abnormal returns in competitor 
companies during major sectoral incidents, however, their share price is 
found to otherwise increase should the incident be considered minor. 
This research does not extend its scope beyond abnormal pricing, 
however, the sentiment of the results further indicate that the work of  
Chance and Ferris (1987) might not represent the industry today.  
Kaplanski and Levy (2010) analysed the influence of aviation disasters 
on stock prices while considering the role of sentiment. Should a market 
loss of more than US$60 million, the authors identify evidence of 
substantial negative stock market responses, increased perceived risk 
and implied volatility, despite no evidence of an increase in actual 
volatility. Such a result is, of course, not limited to the aviation sector.  
Carpentier and Suret (2015) found that such losses exist across a broad 
number of major accidents, however, they do not persist. Ho et al. 
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(2013) found that airlines that suffer a crash experience deeper nega-
tive abnormal returns as the degree of fatality increases, but also, the 
stock prices of the rival airlines also suffer in large-scale disasters but 
benefit from the disasters when the fatality is minor. Hung and Liu 
(2005) use the beta value, an indicator of systematic risk, to estimate 
the costs of equity and the evaluation of a stock's reasonable price, to 
find that airline betas are volatile over time and that crashes also im-
pact them in addition to their stock return and volatility. 
Outside of just stock market performance in isolation, there might 
exist channels through which corporate effects can also be transferred 
to airlines companies. While legal liability, broad reputational damage 
and the loss of equipment can be found to explain a substantial amount 
of the target company's losses, guided by the work of Walker, Walker, 
Thiengtham, and Pukthuanthong (2014) found that there are a number 
of regulatory factors that extend far beyond insurance premiums and 
reputational damage. Dillon, Johnson, and Pate-Cornell (1999) identi-
fied evidence to suggest that in the aftermath of a single aviation in-
cident, shareholders appear to update their estimates of the probability 
of a future incident, acting as an explanation for the substantial cu-
mulative abnormal returns that exist. Exogenous events might also have 
such negative outcomes. For example, Corbet, O'Connell, Efthymiou, 
Guiomard, and Lucey (2019) found that traffic flows fall quite sharply 
despite significant fare reductions as a result of terrorist incidents in 
Europe. Such terrorism impacts were also found to be both significant 
and substantial when considering the persistence of their effects at both 
sectoral and national levels (Carter & Simkins, 2004; Corbet, Gurdgiev, 
& Meegan, 2018; Kim & Gu, 2004; Kolaric & Schiereck, 2016).  
Carvalho, Klagge, and Moench (2011) analysed the 2008 case where an 
six-year old article based on the bankruptcy of United Airline's parent 
company was mistakenly identified as a new bankruptcy filing, causing 
a 76% fall in the company's share price, but after the case was identified 
as an error, the stock remained over 11% below opening prices, as the 
authors identify that contagion effects would dominated competitive 
effects. Luo (2007) used longitudinal real-world data set that matches 
consumer negative voice (complaint records) in the airline industry 
with firm stock prices, this article finds that higher levels of current 
Table 1 
Summary statistics of analysed traded airlines.            
DJIA WTI AVI Stob AFLT AEROMEX AC.TO AIRF.PA  
Mean  0.0003  0.0002  0.0005  0.0000  0.0008  −0.0002  0.0002  −0.0002 
Std. Dev.  0.0108  0.023  0.0115  0.0189  0.1047  0.0165  0.0353  0.0310 
Minimum  −0.0820  −0.1654  −0.0751  −0.1779  −5.4381  −0.1037  −0.3465  −0.3510 
Median  0.0003  0.0000  0.0007  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Maximum  0.1051  0.1641  0.1028  0.1552  4.8675  0.2869  0.3983  0.5996 
Skewness  −0.1925  −0.0773  −0.1486  0.1031  −7.4295  2.71  −0.1579  0.6207 
Kurtosis  11.4064  7.3101  9.1538  10.1885  2266.2442  52.7834  20.6945  40.2413 
Jarque Bera  18,786.8***  4934.8***  10,069.8***  8117.5***  1,124,387,646.1***  221,518.9***  42,659.6***  366,494.8*** 
ADF  −84.1535***  −81.6929***  −71.6901***  −65.7135***  −72.1191***  −47.2714***  −50.5512***  −76.4258***             
ALK 020560.KS BA 2610.TW 600,029.SS COMJ.J UAL.O DAL  
Mean  0.0004  0.0000  0.0000  −0.0002  0.0002  0.0001  0.0002  0.0003 
Std. Dev.  0.0269  0.0287  0.0217  0.0209  0.0284  0.0339  0.0405  0.0328 
Minimum  −0.3364  −0.1713  −0.2384  −0.099  −0.1058  −0.2955  −0.4584  −0.2374 
Median  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Maximum  0.2722  0.2624  0.1568  0.1054  0.0963  0.3208  0.522  0.2355 
Skewness  −0.1714  0.422  −0.18  0.0842  −0.0537  0.0652  −0.0227  −0.1072 
Kurtosis  14.1765  10.0078  11.1471  5.5098  5.8805  12.7829  25.6682  11.4603 
Jarque Bera  33,170.1***  10,522.7***  17,643.2***  1678.1***  1431.2***  21,701***  74,529.4***  9415.4*** 
ADF  −82.9115***  −66.3049***  −76.1207***  −78.4393***  −58.9574***  −80.8645***  −54.9817***  −55.5217***             
GIAA.JK KQNA.NR 003490.KS PIAa.KA SAS.ST SIAL.SL LUV THAI.BK  
Mean  −0.0002  −0.0008  0.0001  −0.0001  −0.0006  0.0000  0.0004  −0.0003 
Std. Dev.  0.023  0.0376  0.0312  0.0379  0.0313  0.0167  0.0223  0.0289 
Minimum  −0.1467  −1.8589  −0.1625  −0.3656  −0.3291  −0.1295  −0.2753  −0.2204 
Median  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Maximum  0.174  0.1209  0.2252  0.3733  0.2821  0.1437  0.1576  0.257 
Skewness  1.0895  −27.1798  0.2564  0.7466  0.1416  0.1527  −0.3554  0.4672 
Kurtosis  9.562  1301.0383  7.1936  12.2007  13.611  9.4477  10.6379  10.087 
Jarque Bera  4310.7***  328,851,069.6***  4735.3***  23,042***  21,919.6***  11,053.5***  15,610.6***  13,555.9*** 
ADF  −48.0585***  −62.847***  −74.1804***  −80.6308***  −66.1177***  −83.2529***  −86.4308***  −79.9079***             
THYAO.IS UTAR.MM MASM AIRA.KL LTM.SN LHAG.DE SEBF.PA SIAL.SI  
Mean  0.0009  0.0003  −0.0004  0.0002  0.0004  0.0001  0.0003  0.0000 
Std. Dev.  0.0341  0.0421  0.025  0.0217  0.02  0.0212  0.0201  0.0167 
Minimum  −0.202  −0.7366  −0.5051  −0.1364  −0.1773  −0.1636  −0.1697  −0.1295 
Median  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Maximum  0.1796  1.772  0.2877  0.1281  0.1823  0.1571  0.1617  0.1437 
Skewness  0.3318  15.4432  −0.7642  0.1939  0.351  −0.1347  0.1246  0.1527 
Kurtosis  7.7116  709.5296  40.1085  7.1934  13.1096  6.9893  8.3459  9.4477 
Jarque Bera  6006.1***  99,381,603.3***  365,937.4***  2799.2***  26,213.2***  4241.3***  7598.1***  11,053.5*** 
ADF  −78.8869***  −65.7303***  −81.0661***  −59.4133***  −66.4438***  −77.8715***  −80.2885***  −83.2529*** 
Note: We establish the above list noting that each company must be publicly traded with an available stock ticker between the period June 1, 1995 and May 31,2019. 
This specific time period is identified due to the relative absence of concise financial market in the period before. Stock price data is taken from Thomson Reuters 
Eikon.  
E. Akyildirim, et al.   International Review of Financial Analysis 69 (2020) 101468
3
consumer negative voice harm firms' future idiosyncratic stock returns. 
Since energy commodities play an important role for the airlines 
industry, their price fluctuations can also create problems for aviation 
stocks in financial markets. Treanor, Rogers, Carter, and Simkins (2014) 
found that airlines that increase their hedging activity due to higher 
fuel price exposure are not receive a premium in their valuation when 
compared to those airlines employing more stable hedging policies. 
However, Berghofer and Lucey (2014) found that there exists less sig-
nificant negative exposure coefficients among US carriers. Yun and 
Yoon (2019) found that there is a return and volatility spillover effect 
between crude oil price and the stock prices of airlines and that the 
stock prices of smaller airlines of South Korea and China are relatively 
more sensitive to the change in oil price. Kristjanpoller and Concha 
(2016) found a strong positive influence of fuel price fluctuation and 
airline stock returns using GARCH-family methodologies. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
We begin our analysis developing a concise list of aviation disasters 
that can then be utilised in a thorough and robust methodological in-
vestigation through an analysis of parent companies who trade on stock 
markets and their subsequent performance. Broad speculation based on 
the cause of such an airline disaster can manifest through many forms, 
but direct financial punishment due to investor perceptions can present 
a number of damaging side-effects for the broad aviation sector. To 
develop such a dataset, we develop a number of strict rules in an at-
tempt to standardise the process across major international financial 
markets. The first implemented rule is that the specified company must 
be a publicly traded company with an available stock ticker between 
the period June 1, 1995 and May 31, 2019. This specific time period is 
identified due to the relative absence of concise financial market in the 
period before. Our selected stock price data is taken from Thomson 
Reuters Eikon. The second news selection rule is based on the source of 
the aviation disaster data. We develop on a combined search of 
LexisNexis, Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters Eikon, search for the 
keywords relating to aviation disasters. For added robustness of our 
developed dataset, we leverage upon that of the National 
Transportation Safety Board (available at: https://www.ntsb.gov), the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO (available at: https:// 
www.icao.int) and the Aviation Safety Reporting System (available at: 
Fig. 1. Cumulative number of incidents and fatalities of traded airlines, by quarter, Q2 1995 through Q2 2019. 
Note: The above figure presents the cumulative number of incidents that have taken place by quarter during the sample period analysed in the top panel. In the 
bottom panel, we find the estimates of the total number of fatalities by quarter analysed. 
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https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov). 
To obtain a viable observation, a single result must be present across 
each of the selected search engines and the source was denoted as an 
international news agency, a mainstream domestic news agency or the 
company making the announcement itself. Forums, social media and 
bespoke news websites were omitted from the search. Finally, the se-
lected observation is based solely on the confirmed news announce-
ments being made on the same day across all of the selected sources. If a 
confirmed article or news release had a varying date of release, it was 
omitted due to this associated ambiguity. All observations found to be 
made on either a Saturday or Sunday are denoted as active on the 
following Monday morning. All times are adjusted to GMT, with the 
official end of day closing price treated as the listed observation for 
each comparable company when analysing associated contagion effects. 
In Table 1 we observe the relevant summary statistics for the included 
aviation companies that experienced severe aviation disasters 
throughout the time period analysed. 
In Fig. 1, we observe the cumulative number of incidents and 
fatalities that occurred on a quarterly basis between Q2 1995 and Q2 
2019. There is evidence of a decline in both estimates, with peaks ex-
perienced throughout the period between Q1 1996 and Q4 1996. In 
total, there are 610 incidents included in our analysis, of which there 
were 12,692 fatalities. The worst incidents include that of the crash of a 
Saudi Arabian Airlines Boeing 747–100 in New Delhi in November 
1996, which led to the death of 312 people. Further, in the 11 Sep-
tember terrorist attacks of 2001, the Airbus A300–600 that crashed in 
New York leading to the deaths of 262 persons is also included among 
the worst incidents included in the database. The second and fourth 
most severe incidents included unfortunately involve the same com-
pany, Malaysia Airlines. In 2014, an idiosyncratic succession of acci-
dents, unparalleled in aviation history unfolded within a five month 
time frame as two widebody aircraft operated by Malaysia Airlines 
Fig. 2. Geographic dispersion of incidents as denoted by domicile country of traded company. 
Note: The above figure presents the geographical dispersion and frequency of incidents as separated by the domicile country of the traded company. The lower panel 
presents the geographic dispersion of incidents as separated by crash site. 
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crashed under inconceivable circumstances. The first tragedy to strike 
Malaysia Airlines was the loss of flight MH370, which disappeared 
while flying from Kuala Lumpur International Airport to Beijing Capital 
International Airport on 8 March 2014 with the loss of 227 passengers 
and 12 crew. Inmarsat satellites identified two potential trajectories, 
that MH370 could have taken, but after much analysis the investigators 
speculated with a high degree of probability that the perilous aircraft 
was navigated along a southern trajectory, leading it deep into the 
southern Indian Ocean. After one of the most expensive searches in 
aviation history, the aircraft has not been found, however several pieces 
of debris washed ashore in the western Indian Ocean during 2015 and 
2016 which were confirmed to be from the airliner. In the aftermath of 
the loss of MH370, Malaysia Airlines were then subjected to their 
second significant loss as MH17, a scheduled flight from Amsterdam to 
Kuala Lumpur that was shot down on 17 July 2014 while flying over 
eastern Ukraine, where an armed conflict broke out in April 2014. 
Flights over the conflict zone were allowed as there was no indication of 
risk for civil aeroplanes at cruising altitude and Malaysia Airlines, as 
almost all airlines, assumed that the airspace is safe. A Buk 9 M38-series 
surface-to-air missile with a 9N314M warhead was found to have 
downed the aircraft. An explosive decompression resulted in the dis-
integration of the aircraft while in-flight and all 283 passengers to-
gether with 15 crew members perished resulting in a wreckage area of 
50 square km on the ground. The four most severe incidents in this 
sample account for 1111 fatalities in the sample. In Fig. 2 we identify 
the geographic dispersion of first, incidents as denoted by the geo-
graphic dispersion of the parent companies of the airlines that have 
experienced the aviation disaster. The second panel displays the geo-
graphic dispersion of the analysed incidents within this research. It is of 
interest to note that a large number of African nations and countries 
such as Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Colombia have experienced a 
broad number of aviation disasters in their respective nations, however, 
there are few incidents recorded in our dataset that include airlines 
from these regions that are publicly traded. 
3.2. Methodology 
To further the development of our understanding of disasters within 
the aviation sector, we set out to first specifically analyse the immediate 
pricing and volatility effects on the stock prices of the company that 
owned the plane that has been lost. To add methodological robustness 
to our selected analysis, we have utilised a number of GARCH-family 
methodologies1 while we further attempt to mitigate international 
Fig. 3. Share price volatility response over time due to airline disasters (1995–2019). 
Note: The above figure presents the estimated share price volatility response over time due to airline disasters. The results are separated by five year windows while 
presenting the average results for sixty days both before and after each incident for presentation purposes. 
1 The analysed specifications included EGARCH, GJR-GARCH, TGARCH, 
Asymmetric Power ARCH (APARCH), Component GARCH (CGARCH) and the 
Asymmetric Component GARCH (ACGARCH), with the best selected metho-
dology based on standard goodness-of-fit criteria such as the Akaike informa-
tion criterion, Bayesian information criterion (BIC), Shibata Information 
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factors through the inclusion of the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA), West Texas Intermediate oil prices (WTI) and the SPDR S&P 
Transportation ETF (XTN) which is found to best represent the per-
formance of aviation companies during the period analysed. We further 
consider as to whether such volatility effect has changed in the period 
since the broad growth. In a secondary analysis, we then investigate the 
relationship between each company and the broad measure of the 
aviation index through the use of a DCC-GARCH analysis. It has been 
widely considered that some specific accidents have been large enough 
to generate substantial reverberations throughout the entire sector due 
to the presence of a number of technical and regulatory mishaps (Ho 
et al., 2013; Krieger & Chen, 2015; Nethercutt & Pruitt, 1997). Such 
dynamics could be attributed to the market expectations that future 
regulatory changes could be forthcoming and could even perhaps be 
restrictive to the future profitability of the sector. Finally, to validate 
and add further robustness to the presented results, we investigate the 
sources of price discovery in the relationship between the broad sec-
toral indices and the companies that have experienced such substantial 
loss and reputational damage in an attempt to further analyse investor 
behaviour. We define a distressed airline company as that which has 
experienced a substantial tragedy in the form of the loss of a plane. 
Overall, there are a number of specific questions that we then set out to 
analyse.  
• H1: Has the price response of distressed airline companies varied 
over time and by region in which the incident has occurred?  
• H2: Does the price volatility response of distressed airline companies 
vary based on the scale of the disaster that they have experienced as 
measured by fatality and injury?  
• H3: Has the price volatility response of distressed airline companies 
changed over time?  
• H4: Does there exist a substantial change in dynamic correlation 
between the distressed company and broad aviation indices in the 
periods after such disaster? 
• H5: Does there exist a substantial change in information flows be-
tween the distressed company and broad aviation indices in the 
periods after such disaster? 
The above hypotheses thereby set out to analyse multiple facets of 
financial market distress in the aftermath of such tragedy. The results of 
this paper are of interest to the broad aviation sector, traders, regulators 
and policy-makers alike. While it is not surprising to observe that dis-
tressed aviation companies in such situations exhibit substantial and 
significant negative effects, it is very much of interest to further our 
understanding of the sources of such risk and indeed, as to whether it is 
contagious upon the entire aviation sector. Should there be evidence 
Fig. 4. Share price volatility response by region due to airline disasters. 
Note: The above figure presents the estimated share price volatility response by investigated region, while presenting the average results for sixty days both before 
and after each incident for presentation purposes. 
(footnote continued) 
Criterion and the Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
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identified of a substantial link, this would develop potential fears about 
the broad financial safety of the sector and a strong potential for issues 
such as moral hazard and asymmetric information to develop as 
weaker, less regulatory compliant companies could potentially influ-
ence the growth, development and financial viability of companies who 
are behaving in a regulatory-compliant manner. 
To begin our analysis, we first utilise a multivariate EGARCH(p,q) 
methodology to identify scale of the change in volatility in the period 
after the identified aviation incidents. At this stage, a number of 
goodness-of-fit testing procedures identified the EGARCH(1,1) model as 
the best selected to identify specific volatility changes in the companies' 
returns, thus we exercise our analysis using this model.2 The EGARCH 
specification developed on that of the GARCH specification proposed by  
Bollerslev (1986) and was designed to include lagged conditional var-
iance terms as autoregressive terms. We specifically develop on an 
EGARCH methodology to analyse the volatility effects within the 
aviation industry due to aviation disasters. We first let rt = [r1, t, …, rn, 
t]′ be the vector of financial time series returns and εt = [ε1, t, …, εn, t]′ 
be the vector of return residuals obtained after some filtration. Let hi, t 
be the corresponding conditional volatilities obtained from a univariate 
EGARCH process. We assume that Et−1[εt]=0 and Et−1[εtεt′] = Ht, 
where Et[⋅] is the conditional expectation on εt, εt−1, …. Then the asset 
conditional covariance matrix Ht can be written as 
=H D R Dt t t t
1/2 1/2 (1) 
where Rt = [ρij, t] is the asset conditional correlation matrix and the 
diagonal matrix of the asset conditional variances is given by 
Dt = diag (h1, t, …, hn, t). We express the variance equation of our 
EGARCH model as follows: 
= + + + +h E h Dln( ) ( ( )) ln( )t t t t t t
2
1 1 1 1
2 (2) 
which states that the value of the variance scaling parameter ht now 
depends both on the past value of the shocks, which are captured by the 
lagged square residual terms, and on past values of itself, which are 
captured by the lagged ht terms. Specification tests found that the 
EGARCH(1,1) model served as the best fitting to estimate volatility 
effects through the use of dummy variables that are used to denote both 
the time-of-the-day and also periods of substantial traditional market 
volatility.3 It is also necessary to mitigate international effects which 
Fig. 5. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) over time due to airline disasters (1995–2019). 
Note: The above figure presents the estimated Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) response over time due to airline disasters. The results are separated by five year 
windows while presenting the average results for sixty days both before and after each incident for presentation purposes. 
2 EGARCH exploits information contained in realised measures of volatility 
while providing a flexible leverage function that accounts for return-volatility 
dependence. While remaining in a GARCH-like modelling framework and es-
timation convenience, the model allows independent return and volatility shock 
and this dual shock nature leaves a room for the establishment of a variance risk 
premium. 3 The optimal model is chosen according to three information criteria, namely 
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can be completed through the inclusion of the returns of traditional 
financial products in the mean equation of the EGARCH(1,1) metho-
dology. The volatility sourced in shocks that are incorporated in the 
returns of traditional financial markets are therefore considered in the 
volatility estimation of the selected structure. In summary, the esti-
mated model has the following form: 
= + + + + +
=
R a b R b DJIA b WTI b AvETFt
j





= + + + +h E h Dln( ) (| | (| |)) ln( )t t t t t t
2
1 1 1 1
2 (4)  
Rt−n represents the lagged value of stock returns, n days before Rt is 
observed. DJIAt represents the interaction between the distressed 
aviation company and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), while 
WTIt represents the interaction with West Texas Intermediate oil prices 
(WTI), which is a market found to be very closely associated with the 
aviation sector (Kristjanpoller & Concha, 2016; Yun & Yoon, 2019), but 
also a very strong signal of multiple forms of economic strife (Chuang, 
Chiu, & Edward Wang, 2008), therefore acting as a strong barometer of 
international effects within our selected methodological structure. Fi-
nally, AvETFt represents that of the SPDR S&P Transportation ETF 
(XTN) which is found to best represent the performance of aviation 
companies during the period analysed. Finally, Dt is included in the 
variance equation to provide a coefficient relating to the volatility re-
sponse to the thirty-day period after which the aviation tragedy has 
occurred. 
In the next stage of our analysis, we investigate Hypothesis H4, 
which specifically tests as to whether there has been a substantial 
change in dynamic correlations between the distressed company that 
has experienced the aviation disaster and the selected aviation indices 
in the period thereafter. To complete such an analysis, we test for the 
presence of such comovements in aviation markets and then specifically 
investigate their responses thereafter using a DCC-GARCH metho-
dology. Engle (2002) models the right hand side of Eq. (1) rather than 
Ht directly and proposes the dynamic correlation structure 
=
= + +
R Q Q Q
Q a b S au u bQ
{ } { } ,
(1 ) ,
t t t t
t t t t
1/2 1/2
1 1 1 (5) 
Fig. 6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) by region due to airline disasters. 
Note: The above figure presents the estimated Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) by investigated region, while presenting the average results for sixty days both 
before and after each incident for presentation purposes. 
(footnote continued) 
the Akaike (AIC), Bayesian (BIC) and Hannan-Quinn(HQ), all of which consider 
both how good the fitting of the model is and the number of parameters in the 
model, rewarding a better fitting and penalising an increased number of 
parameters for given data sets. The selected model is the one with the minimum 
criteria values. We also used a variety of dummy-lengths in Eq. (3), denoted as 
Dt in the variance equation, but the twenty-day period after each selected event 
was denoted as the most stable specification across our selected methodologies. 
Results of all these specification tests are available from the authors on request. 
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where Qt ≡ [qij, t], ut = [u1, t,…,un, t]′ and ui, t is the transformed 
residuals i.e. ui, t = εi, t/hi, t, S ≡ [sij] = E[utut′] is the n × n un-
conditional covariance matrix of ut, Qt
∗ = diag {Qt} and a, b are non- 
negative scalars satisfying a + b < 1. The parameters of the DCC model 
are estimated by using the quasi-maximum likelihood method with 
respect to the log-likelihood function, and according to the state two- 
step procedure. When specifying the form of the conditional correlation 
matrix Rt, two requirements have to be considered. The first is that the 
covariance matrix Ht has to be positive and the second is that all the 
elements in the conditional correlation matrix Rt have to be equal or 
less than unity. The DCC model is estimated by using a two-step ap-
proach to maximise the log-likelihood function. As proposed by Engle 
(2002), the DCC-GARCH model is designed to allow for a two-stage 
estimation of the conditional variance matrix ht. In the first stage, 
univariate GARCH (1,1) volatility models are fitted for each of the stock 
return residuals and estimates of hit are obtained. In the second stage, 
stock return residuals are transformed by their estimated standard de-




. Finally, the standardised re-
sidual zit is used to estimate the correlation parameters. If we let θ 
denote the parameters in Dt and ϑ, the parameters in Rt, then the log- 
likelihood is: 
= + + +
= =
l



















The first part of the log likelihood function is volatility, which is the 
sum of the individual GARCH likelihoods. The log-likelihood function 
Table 2 
Significant increases in conditional volatility in the short-run after the event.              
Date Event ID a0 Rt−1 DJIAt WTIt AVIt ω α β γ Dt  
15/09/1995 Ev.2 0.0004 −0.0210 0.0546*** −0.0389*** 0.4510*** −0.0184*** −0.0023 0.9947*** 0.0755*** 0.0139**  
Std. Error (0.0003) (0.0140) (0.0210) (0.0134) (0.0362) (0.0066) (0.0075) (0.0002) (0.0044) (0.0065) 
15/08/1996 Ev.4 −0.0005*** −0.0172 0.0390 −0.0241*** 0.8398*** 0.0199*** −0.0020 1.0000*** 0.0339*** 0.0177***  
Std. Error (0.0002) (0.0142) (0.0289) (0.0072) (0.0508) (0.0022) (0.0065) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0020) 
29/08/1996 Ev.5 −0.0005*** −0.0157* 0.0388*** −0.0233*** 0.8371*** 0.0199*** −0.0023 1.0000*** 0.0341*** 0.0177***  
Std. Error (0.0001) (0.0093) (0.0138) (0.0083) (0.0475) (0.0022) (0.0063) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0020) 
06/08/1997 Ev.8 −0.0005*** −0.0049*** 0.0331 −0.0180 0.8036* −0.0080** −0.0082 0.9933*** 0.0677*** 0.0393***  
Std. Error (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0413) (0.0110) (0.0509) (0.0035) (0.0077) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0037) 
15/10/1997 Ev.9 0.0001 0.1546*** 0.1523** −0.0063 0.3184*** −0.0770** −0.0289*** 0.9834*** 0.1407** 0.0455***  
Std. Error (0.0004) (0.0163) (0.0766) (0.0130) (0.0490) (0.0174) (0.0124) (0.0016) (0.0152) (0.0103) 
14/08/1998 Ev.12 −0.0004** −0.0074 0.0226** −0.0188 0.8157*** −0.0515*** −0.0046 0.9857*** 0.0818*** 0.0534***  
Std. Error (0.0002) (0.0054) (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0388) (0.0023) (0.0097) (0.0003) (0.0092) (0.0029) 
31/01/2000 Ev.14 0.0000 0.0267 −0.1103 0.0903*** 0.3918*** 0.0612*** −0.0131 0.9563*** 0.1970*** 0.3716***  
Std. Error (0.0006) (0.0235) (0.0840) (0.0177) (0.0833) (0.0123) (0.0171) (0.0009) (0.0412) (0.0071) 
06/03/2000 Ev.15 −0.0015** −0.0506*** −0.0359*** 0.1184* 0.0111*** −0.5107** −0.0069 0.9149*** 0.2388* 0.0345**  
Std. Error (0.0007) (0.0119) (0.0026) (0.0633) (0.0014) (0.2304) (0.0151) (0.0367) (0.0520) (0.0171) 
24/04/2000 Ev.16 0.0000 0.0338 −0.1087** 0.0916*** 0.3875*** 0.0332*** −0.0149 0.9446*** 0.2136* 0.4324***  
Std. Error (0.0002) (0.0205) (0.0481) (0.0141) (0.0507) (0.0081) (0.0176) (0.0050) (0.0695) (0.0293) 
01/05/2000 Ev.17 0.0000 0.0338 −0.1072* 0.0914*** 0.3864*** 0.0318 −0.0145 0.9447*** 0.2132 0.4309***  
Std. Error (0.0002) (0.0262) (0.0603) (0.0137) (0.0629) (0.0734) (0.0174) (0.0157) (0.1067) (0.1521) 
31/10/2000 Ev.20 −0.0004*** −0.1104*** −0.0087** 0.0035** 0.2292*** −0.1828*** −0.0144*** 0.9748*** 0.2356** 0.0196**  
Std. Error (0.0001) (0.0135) (0.0044) (0.0014) (0.0207) (0.0097) (0.0051) (0.0008) (0.0302) (0.0084) 
27/08/2001 Ev.21 0.0001 0.0344 −0.0888 0.0829*** 0.3629*** −1.0888** 0.0174 0.7773*** 0.2606 0.6206**  
Std. Error (0.0006) (0.0295) (0.0667) (0.0163) (0.0778) (0.4961) (0.0428) (0.0982) (0.0840) (0.3131) 
08/01/2003 Ev.26 0.0001 −0.0236 0.0219 −0.0239 0.4379*** −0.5586*** −0.0029 0.9079*** 0.1412*** 0.1204***  
Std. Error (0.0002) (0.0147) (0.0160) (0.0154) (0.0382) (0.0186) (0.0123) (0.0030) (0.0309) (0.0102) 
06/03/2003 Ev.27 −0.0010*** −0.0646*** −0.0692 −0.1057 0.1384*** −0.5979** −0.0089 0.9027*** 0.2400*** 0.0310*  
Std. Error (0.0003) (0.0130) (0.0546) (0.0757) (0.0535) (0.2858) (0.0156) (0.0452) (0.0627) (0.0166) 
03/02/2005 Ev.29 −0.0004*** −0.1155 0.0084 0.0053 0.2155** −0.2463*** −0.0142 0.9672*** 0.2468*** 0.0262***  
Std. Error (0.0001) (0.1469) (0.2261) (0.0218) (0.1001) (0.0459) (0.0151) (0.0059) (0.0365) (0.0081) 
21/06/2006 Ev.30 0.0003 −0.0230 0.0283 −0.0286 0.4348*** −0.2536*** −0.0032 0.9588*** 0.1487*** 0.0495***  
Std. Error (0.0004) (0.0158) (0.0741) (0.0214) (0.0807) (0.0231) (0.0106) (0.0042) (0.0276) (0.0096) 
07/05/2007 Ev.35 0.0000 0.3739 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 −0.1386 0.1839 0.9896*** 0.5064 0.1835*  
Std. Error (0.0002) (1.8072) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.5712) (1.7155) (0.1000) (0.6920) (0.1034) 
17/07/2007 Ev.36 0.0002** 0.1556*** 0.1673*** −0.0098*** 0.3090*** −0.2578*** −0.0323** 0.9632*** 0.1690*** 0.0439***  
Std. Error (0.0001) (0.0150) (0.0400) (0.0016) (0.0361) (0.0145) (0.0147) (0.0015) (0.0134) (0.0074) 
13/08/2007 Ev.37 −0.0001*** 0.0694** 0.3947 −0.1005** 0.5097 −0.0386*** −0.0245** 0.9958*** 0.1007*** 0.0209***  
Std. Error (0.0007) (0.0320) (0.2561) (0.0306) (0.2571) (0.0066) (0.0107) (0.0004) (0.0062) (0.0063) 
14/09/2007 Ev.39 0.0003*** −0.0237*** 0.0340** −0.0328** 0.4396** −0.1221** −0.0044 0.9799*** 0.1139*** 0.0229***  
Std. Error (0.0002) (0.0073) (0.0280) (0.0119) (0.0461) (0.0197) (0.0087) (0.0034) (0.0197) (0.0054) 
15/09/2008 Ev.41 0.0003 −0.0245** 0.0546 −0.0338 0.4338*** −0.1059*** −0.0015 0.9826*** 0.1050*** 0.0203***  
Std. Error (0.0007) (0.0117) (0.0634) (0.0256) (0.1460) (0.0335) (0.0103) (0.0048) (0.0237) (0.0034) 
12/01/2009 Ev.43 −0.0001 0.0022 1.1424*** −0.2101*** 0.2868*** −0.0127*** −0.0136 0.9970*** 0.0360*** 0.0102***  
Std. Error (0.0003) (0.0173) (0.0783) (0.0228) (0.0868) (0.0021) (0.0083) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0022) 
29/11/2013 Ev.56 0.0000 0.0891 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0109 −0.1072 0.9872*** 0.9912 0.2575*  
Std. Error (0.0001) (0.2865) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (1.0367) (2.2909) (0.0021) (1.7238) (0.1530) 
04/03/2019 Ev.67 −0.0017*** −0.0537*** −0.0246 0.1157* −0.0074 −0.5349** −0.0011 0.9155*** 0.2342*** 0.0963*  
Std. Error (0.0002) (0.0125) (0.0513) (0.0653) (0.0442) (0.2561) (0.0142) (0.0397) (0.0546) (0.0516) 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of the mean and conditional variance equations; i.e., Rt = a0 + b1Rt−1 + b2DJIA + b3WTI + b4AVI + εt; and ln 
(ht
2) = ω + αεt−1 + γ(|εt−1|−E(|εt−1| )) + β ln (ht−1
2) + Dt respectively. Rt−1 represents the lagged value of the observed company returns. The term ht is the 
conditional volatility estimated by the EGARCH process and Dt is a dummy term to provide a coefficient relating to the observed changes in the conditional volatility 
in the subsequent period following each event for each of our investigated companies. Only the results for the companies with a significant positive Dt term is 
presented. For brevity, only the significant results for entire dummy period are presented. The values in the parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * denote 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
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can be maximised in the first stage over the parameters Dt. Given the 
estimated parameters in the first stage, the correlation component of 
the likelihood function in the second stage is maximised to estimate the 
correlation coefficients. Finally, we examine the DCC-GARCH model's 
change in behaviour before and after each airline disaster, measuring 
the specific relationship between the associated airline and the broad 
aviation sector as measured by the SPDR S&P Transportation ETF 
(XTN). 
In the final stage of our analysis, and to provide additional metho-
dological robustness, we analyse the changing behaviour of price dis-
covery in the periods after such aviation disasters. There are two 
standard measures of price discovery commonly employed in the lit-
erature: the Hasbrouck (1995) Information Share (IS) and the Gonzalo 
and Granger (1995) Component Share (CS) approach. Hasbrouck 
(1995) demonstrates that the contribution of a price series to price 
discovery (the ‘Information Share’) can be measured by the proportion 
of the variance in the common efficient price innovations that is ex-
plained by innovations in that price series. Gonzalo and Granger (1995) 
decompose a cointegrated price series into a permanent component and 
a temporary component using error correction coefficients. The per-
manent component is interpreted as the common efficient price, the 
temporary component reflects deviations from the efficient price caused 
by trading fractions. We estimate IS and CS, as developed by  
Hauptfleisch, Putniņš, and Lucey (2016) using the error correction 
parameters and variance-covariance of the error terms from the Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM): 
= + + +
= =












= + + +
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where Δpi, t is the change in the log price (pi, t) of the asset traded in 
market i at time t. The next stage is to obtain the component shares from 
the normalised orthogonal vector of error correction coefficients, 
therefore: 





1 2 (9)  





















( ) ( )
1
1 11 2 12
2
1 11 2 12
2
2 22











1 11 2 12
2
2 22
2 (12)  
Recent studies show that IS and CS are sensitive to the relative level 
of noise in each market, they measure a combination of leadership in 
impounding new information and the relative level of noise in the price 
series from each market. The measures tend to overstate the price 
discovery contribution of the less noisy market. An appropriate com-
bination of IS and CS cancels out dependence on noise, Yan and Zivot 
(2010); Putniņš (2013). The combined measure is known as the In-




























































Number(percent) of companies experiencing an increase in their stock returns' 
unconditional volatility in the short and long-run after the (crash) event.        
Company [−10,+10] [−20,+20] [−40,+40] [−60,+60] [all pre- 
ann, all 
post-ann]  
Panel A: Log-returns with higher variance 
2610.TW 3 (100) 3 (100) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 
AC.TO 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 
AEROMEX 1 (50) 1 (50) 2 (100) 2 (100) 1 (50) 
AFLT 2 (50) 1 (25) 1 (25) 1 (25) 0 (0) 
AIRA.KL 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 
AIRF.PA 4 (80) 3 (60) 2 (40) 1 (20) 0 (0) 
ALK 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 0 (0) 
BA 3 (75) 2 (50) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (50) 
DAL 1 (50) 2 (100) 2 (100) 2 (100) 0 (0) 
GIAA.JK 1 (100) 0 (0) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 
LTM.SN 3 (75) 3 (75) 2 (50) 2 (50) 1 (25) 
MASM 3 (100) 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 
PIAa.KA 3 (50) 3 (50) 2 (33.33) 3 (50) 2 (33.33) 
THYAO.IS 3 (50) 2 (33.33) 2 (33.33) 2 (33.33) 0 (0) 
UAL.O 4 (100) 4 (100) 3 (75) 3 (75) 0 (0) 
UTAR.MM 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 0 (0) 
ALL 39 (58.21) 35 (52.24) 31 (46.27) 30 (44.78) 13 (19.4)  
Panel B: Log-returns with significantly higher variance 
AEROMEX 1 (50) 1 (50) 2 (100) 2 (100) 0 (0) 
AFLT 2 (50) 1 (25) 1 (25) 1 (25) 0 (0) 
AIRF.PA 3 (60) 2 (40) 1 (20) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
DAL 0 (0) 1 (50) 2 (100) 1 (50) 0 (0) 
LTM.SN 1 (25) 2 (50) 2 (50) 2 (50) 1 (25) 
MASM 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 
PIAa.KA 0 (0) 1 (16.67) 0 (0) 2 (33.33) 2 (33.33) 
THYAO.IS 2 (33.33) 2 (33.33) 2 (33.33) 2 (33.33) 0 (0) 
UAL.O 2 (50) 2 (50) 2 (50) 3 (75) 0 (0) 
ALL 17 (25.37) 17 (25.37) 18 (26.87) 20 (29.85) 11 (16.42)  
Panel C: Excess log-returns with higher variance 
2610.TW 3 (100) 3 (100) 3 (100) 3 (100) 1 (33.33) 
AEROMEX 1 (50) 1 (50) 2 (100) 2 (100) 2 (100) 
AFLT 3 (75) 2 (50) 1 (25) 1 (25) 0 (0) 
AIRF.PA 4 (80) 3 (60) 2 (40) 1 (20) 0 (0) 
BA 3 (75) 2 (50) 1 (25) 1 (25) 2 (50) 
DAL 1 (50) 2 (100) 2 (100) 2 (100) 0 (0) 
LTM.SN 2 (50) 3 (75) 3 (75) 2 (50) 1 (25) 
MASM 3 (100) 3 (100) 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 
PIAa.KA 2 (33.33) 2 (33.33) 3 (50) 3 (50) 2 (33.33) 
THYAO.IS 4 (66.67) 2 (33.33) 2 (33.33) 2 (33.33) 0 (0) 
UAL.O 4 (100) 4 (100) 4 (100) 4 (100) 0 (0) 
UTAR.MM 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 0 (0) 
ALL 40 (25.37) 36 (28.36) 35 (25.37) 31 (23.88) 13 (16.42)  
Panel D: Excess log-returns with significantly higher variance 
AFLT 2 (50) 1 (25) 1 (25) 1 (25) 0 (0) 
DAL 1 (50) 1 (50) 2 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
LTM.SN 1 (25) 3 (75) 2 (50) 1 (25) 1 (25) 
MASM 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 
PIAa.KA 1 (16.67) 2 (33.33) 0 (0) 2 (33.33) 2 (33.33) 
THYAO.IS 1 (16.67) 2 (33.33) 2 (33.33) 2 (33.33) 0 (0) 
UAL.O 2 (50) 3 (75) 2 (50) 2 (50) 0 (0) 
ALL 17 (25.37) 19 (28.36) 17 (25.37) 16 (23.88) 11 (16.42) 
Note: This table shows the number of companies that experience a higher un-
conditional volatility in their stock prices after announcements. The column 
headers show the unconditional volatility calculation periods in days before 
and after the announcements. In the table, the values in the parentheses are the 
percentage of companies within the sub-groups experiencing an increase in 
their stock returns' unconditional variances. Panel A (Panel B) reports the 
number of companies that experience a (significantly) higher variance in their 
stocks' daily returns. Panel C (Panel D) reports the number of companies that 
experience a (significantly) higher variance in their stocks' daily excess returns 
over the corresponding market returns. For brevity, only significant and results 








and its Cholesky factorisation, Ω = MM′. 
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Our work on the information share, component share and in-
formation leadership share of price discovery sets out to address the 
final stated hypothesis as to whether there exist substantial changes in 
information flows between the distressed aviation companies and broad 
aviation indices in the period after such disasters. 
4. Results 
The first analysed hypothesis investigated as to whether the price 
response of airlines in the aftermath of aviation disasters has varied 
substantially. To begin such an analysis, we focus on a number of dif-
ferent characteristics surrounding the behaviour of the share prices of 
companies that have experienced such aviation disasters. In Fig. 3 we 
observe the share price return volatility on a daily level of these com-
panies over time between 1995 and 2019. A one-year sample, both six- 
months before and after the incident is presented. We clearly identify 
that substantially elevated levels of share price volatility on average in 
the periods incorporating 1995 through 2019, however, there is evi-
dence to suggest that this volatility has somewhat decreased in the 
period of time thereafter. Throughout each period, there is evidence 
presented of sharp negative price movements in the days following the 
aviation disaster, however, as is particularly evident in the periods 
2005 through 2019, this is immediately followed by substantial in-
creases in the two-month period after the incident. In Fig. 4 we observe 
the results of a similar analysis that has been separated by the continent 
in which the parent company of the airline was located at the time of 
the incident. For each region analysed, there is substantial evidence of 
immediate negative responses in each jurisdiction with the exception of 
South America which is portrayed as quite a volatility market 
throughout the period analysed. It is Asia and North America that 
present the most substantial decreases in share price in the days im-
mediately after the date on which the incident occurred. On average, 
North American airlines experience quite a substantial increase in share 
price within ten days of the incident. 
In Fig. 5 we analyse the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over 
time and in Fig. 6 we observe the same analysis as separated by the 
region in which the disaster has occurred. The selection of six month 
windows before and after each event is made solely for presentation 
purposes. Focusing on the performance of the CARs over time, we ob-
serve that there exist sharp under-performance of the companies 
throughout each of the analysed time periods with the exception of the 
period between 2000 and 2004. While considering the relative di-
versification that aviation stocks presented throughout the multiple 
international financial crises to portfolio investors, the same stocks 
were very much exposed to shocks in the market for oil (Kristjanpoller 
& Concha, 2016; Yun & Yoon, 2019). There is further evidence that 
CARs do not appear to behave in a similar manner depending on the 
market in which the airline stock is traded. South American airlines 
presented evidence of substantial under-performance when compared 
to international averages in the period before airline crashes leading to 
fatality. This identified under-performance continued in the period 
thereafter. African, European and North American airlines were iden-
tified to largely out-perform broad markets by more than 10%, but in 
the period thereafter, under-performed the same indices by between 6% 
and 10%. When considering this information, we can validate Hy-
pothesis 1, as we clearly identify time-varying and regional differentials 
between airline share price performance due to aviation disasters. 
In the next phase of our analysis, we investigate the changing fi-
nancial market volatility effects of each individual case analysed. In  
Table 2 we present the results of each of the individual EGARCH 
methodologies analysed5 Specifically, dummy analysis in the volatility 
model shows that the largest long-term sustained volatility increase are 
found to relate to that of six specific events: Event 21 (+0.6206), event 
16 (+0.4324), event 17 (+0.4309), event 14 (+0.3716), event 56 
(+0.2575) and event 35 (+0.1835). In Table 3 we observe the number 
of companies that experienced a sustained increase in their stock re-
turns' unconditional volatility in the period after each incident. To this 
effect, we observe as to whether the estimated volatility increases, as 
Table 4 
Significant increases in conditional volatility in the short-run after the event.              
Company Event date a0 Rt−1 DJIA WTI Avi ω α β γ Dt  
AFLT 31 January 2000 −0.0002*** 0.0036 −0.1486*** 0.0814*** 0.4434*** −0.2603*** 0.0034 0.9634*** 0.1528*** 0.2628** 
(0.0001) (0.004) (0.0157) (0.0181) (0.048) (0.0091) (0.0136) (0.0005) (0.0366) (0.1088) 
AFLT 24 April 2000 −0.0004* 0.0092 −0.214*** 0.081*** 0.471*** −0.9938*** 0.0155 0.8634*** 0.3029*** 0.265*** 
(0.0003) (0.0107) (0.0493) (0.0109) (0.0075) (0.015) (0.0288) (0.0001) (0.0344) (0.0412) 
AFLT 01 May 2000 −0.0004* 0.0091 −0.2132*** 0.0808*** 0.4701*** −0.9905*** 0.016 0.8638*** 0.3017*** 0.3063*** 
(0.0002) (0.0131) (0.0526) (0.0116) (0.0075) (0.015) (0.0288) (0.0001) (0.0342) (0.1019) 
AFLT 27 August 2001 −0.0004 0.0095 −0.2185*** 0.0807*** 0.4739*** −0.9822*** 0.0134 0.865*** 0.3016 0.2938** 
(0.0003) (0.014) (0.0539) (0.0164) (0.057) (0.0477) (0.063) (0.014) (0.2331) (0.1247) 
AIRF.PA 15 August 1996 −0.0006 −0.0462*** 0.0952 −0.067*** 0.9138*** −0.0007 −0.0139** 0.9995*** 0.0252*** 0.2558*** 
(0.0004) (0.0167) (0.0741) (0.0197) (0.0634) (0.0007) (0.0064) (0) (0.0011) (0.078) 
AIRF.PA 29 August 1996 −0.0006** −0.0444*** 0.0963** −0.0662*** 0.907*** −0.0024*** −0.0145** 0.9993*** 0.0247*** 0.274*** 
(0.0002) (0.0116) (0.0379) (0.0198) (0.0647) (0.0007) (0.006) (0) (0.0017) (0.0747) 
ALK 15 September 2008 −0.0001 −0.0513*** 1.0525*** −0.1832*** 0.3261*** −0.0673*** −0.0064 0.9906*** 0.0722*** 0.2259*** 
(0.0002) (0.0095) (0.0918) (0.018) (0.0354) (0.0021) (0.0139) (0.0001) (0.0024) (0.0523) 
DAL 12 January 2009 −0.0001 0.004 1.1402*** −0.2078*** 0.2837*** −0.0172*** −0.0233** 0.9973*** 0.0684*** 0.1196*** 
(0.0003) (0.0173) (0.0502) (0.0217) (0.06) (0.0012) (0.0099) (0) (0.0007) (0.0423) 
LTM.SN 15 October 1997 0.0003** 0.1596*** 0.1823*** −0.0102*** 0.318*** −0.2531*** −0.0201 0.9666*** 0.1527*** 0.3463*** 
(0.0001) (0.015) (0.0272) (0.0035) (0.0254) (0.0214) (0.0158) (0.0025) (0.0124) (0.0701) 
PIAa.KA 06 March 2003 −0.0017*** −0.054*** −0.0253 0.1169 −0.0042 −0.5279** −0.0035 0.9163*** 0.2365*** 0.1028** 
(0.0004) (0.0144) (0.0714) (0.077) (0.1098) (0.263) (0.0145) (0.0408) (0.0596) (0.0423) 
THYAO.IS 15 September 1995 0.0004 −0.0218 0.0567 −0.0387* 0.4474*** −0.0334*** −0.0035 0.9945*** 0.0761*** 0.1607*** 
(0.0003) (0.0214) (0.102) (0.0204) (0.0891) (0.0013) (0.0077) (0) (0.0001) (0.0505) 
Note: This table presents the estimation results of the mean and conditional variance equations; i.e., Rt = a0 + b1Rt−1 + b2DJIA + b3WTI + b4AVI + εt; and ln 
(ht
2) = ω + αεt−1 + γ(∣ εt−1 ∣ − E(∣ εt−1 ∣)) + β ln (ht−1
2) + Dt respectively. Rt−1 represents the lagged value of the observed company returns. The term ht is the 
conditional volatility estimated by the EGARCH process and Dt is a dummy term to provide a coefficient relating to the observed changes in the conditional volatility 
in the subsequent 10 days (2 weeks) following each event for each of our investigated companies. Only the results for the companies with a significant positive Dt 
term is presented. For brevity, only significant and results above zero are presented. The values in the parentheses are standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significant 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
5 For brevity, only significant results are presented here. All results across the 
entire range of analysed dummy variables (of 1-day, 5-day, 10-day, 20-day, 40- 
day and 60-day duration) are presented in online appendix. 
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measured by both the logarithm of daily returns and excess logarithm of 
daily returns were significantly different to zero in the periods re-
presenting ten, twenty, forty and sixty days after the incident. The re-
sults are separated between log-returns with a higher variance and 
excess log-returns with higher variance. Within this context, in both 
samples analysed, we observe that there are a large number of com-
panies that experience a sharp increase in unconditional volatility in 
the ten-day period both before and after the aviation incident, in-
dicative of strong short-term effects. However, such effects are found to 
dissipate in the following windows of investigation, based on twenty- 
day, forty-day and sixty-day windows respectively. Such results in-
dicate that while the shock to unconditional volatility appears to be 
immediate, there is evidence to suggest that it dissipates and returns to 
pre-aviation incident levels within sixty days after the event. While 
focusing on the time-variations of the estimated results Table 4 presents 
the significant estimates of short-term (denoted to be the ten-day period 
after the airline disaster) price volatility. We observe that companies 
that have experienced more recent aviation disasters possess an in-
creased correlation with the DJIA and a decreased correlation over time 
with other aviation companies as measured by the SPDR S&P Trans-
portation ETF. Within the models presented in Table 4, we observe the 
sharp, strongly significant increases in short-term volatility in the 
period after the aviation disaster as measured by Dt. 
The variants dummy variable duration of the estimated EGARCH 
methodology allow for the investigation of Hypotheses H2 and H3, 
which specifically analyse as to whether the price volatility response of 
the airline disasters appears to depend on the scale of the disaster as 
measured by the number of fatalities and as to whether such volatility 
effects have changed over time. Fig. 7 presents the results of these 
analyses. While utilising the volatility estimates across all cases in-
cluded in this analysis, we use a scatter-plot to identify the relationship 
between these dummy variable estimates and that of number of fatal-
ities per incident. The results indicate a clear positive relationship be-
tween the two variables, indicating that the estimated EGARCH-vola-
tility appears to be significantly influenced by the scale of the disaster 
in terms of the fatalities generated. These two specific results enable 
acceptance of both Hypotheses 2 and 3 as there is clear evidence of a 
relationship between volatility and incident-severity, while further, 
such volatility effects are found to changed over time. 
In Fig. 8, we specifically analyse as to whether the investigated 
dynamic correlations have changed over time. To complete such an 
analysis we have broken the analysis into five year windows of analysis 
and presented the average dynamic conditional correlation for the sixty 
day period both before and after each incident. We observe that there 
were substantial decreased in correlation in the periods after incidents 
in the period 1995–99, 2000–04 and 2005–09 respectively. However, 
Fig. 7. The relationship between EGARCH-calculated volatility and both the scale and time of the incident. 
Note: The above figures present in the top panel the EGARCH-calculated volatility based on the number of fatalities that have occurred in each incident, while in the 
lower panel, the EGARCH-calculated volatility over time. 
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evidence of such pronounced effects do not appear to occur in the 
periods between 2010 and 14 and 2015–19. While in Fig. 9 we observe 
the average dynamic correlation by region in the sixty day periods both 
before and after the investigated aviation disaster. While crashes in 
Africa are found to have little of substantial change in the period after, 
there are substantial changes in dynamic conditional correlation ob-
served for incidents that have occurred in Asia, Europe, and both North 
and South America respectively. The most substantial effects were ob-
served in South America where the dynamic correlation is found to fall 
from 0.193 on the date of the incident to fall to 0.048 ten days after the 
incident. Such results indicate that there are geographical differences to 
be considered where volatility appears to differ based on the region in 
which the incident occurs. 
In Table 5, we observe the results of the dynamic conditional cor-
relation analysis between the incident company and the selected avia-
tion indices in the aftermath of airline disasters. Such an analysis is used 
to specifically test Hypothesis H4. Two panels are presented in Table 5, 
where the first presents all dummy coefficients that are found to result 
in a positive result for the dynamic conditional correlation, while the 
lower panel presents only significant results. For brevity, only positive 
results are presented, while negligible results are omitted for pre-
sentation purposes only. Each dummy window is presented, based on 1- 
day through 60-day frequencies and an additional analysis which in-
cludes the entire sample period after the aviation disaster. While there 
is a relatively stable number of incidents that present significantly po-
sitive volatility through to the broad aviation industry as represented 
through the twenty-five through twenty-seven incidents that are found 
to present positive dummy coefficients. For the entire period thereafter, 
forty-two companies representing 62.7% of the sample are found to be 
positive while analysing the entire period after the event. However, 
while concentrating on significant results only, there is an interesting 
observation based on the time frame in which the dynamic correlations 
are found to be significantly positive. Only one event is found to have 
generated a significantly positive conditional correlation through to the 
broad aviation indices, however, the effects of this event are found to 
dissipate before twenty days after the event. While forty events are 
found to generate significant positive volatility transfer, it appears that 
such effects become more substantial over time. This could be attrib-
uted to improved information being released to the market as to the 
exact nature and causes of the incident, which could generate profound 
industrial changes dependent on the nature of the scenarios. Due to the 
identification of such significant positive correlations, we can state 
acceptance of Hypothesis H4, namely that individual shocks possess the 
ability to influence the volatility of the entire aviation index. 
The final hypothesis investigates as to whether there exists a sub-
stantial change in information flows between the distressed aviation 
company and broad aviation indices after an airline disaster. In Table 6 
we observe the most substantial changes in the flow of information as 
Fig. 8. Dynamic conditional correlations with aviation sector over time due to airline disasters (1995–2019). 
Note: The above figure presents the dynamic conditional correlations with the aviation sector over time due to airline disasters. The average results for sixty days 
both before and after each incident for presentation purposes. 
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measured by the information share, component share and information 
leadership share of price discovery in the periods both before and after 
the identified significant incidents. In all cases, there were substantial 
decreases in information flow identified between the interactions be-
tween both the airline and the aviation sector. This indicates that there 
is a sharp reduction in the flow of information that can be measured by 
the proportion of the variance in the common efficient price innova-
tions that is explained by innovations in that price series. The perma-
nent component is interpreted as the common efficient price, the tem-
porary component reflects deviations from the efficient price caused by 
trading fractions. In all cases, there is evidence of a sharp decoupling of 
information from broad aviation indices upon that of the companies 
included in the analysis. These results present substantial evidence of a 
significant decoupling between the airline and other similar companies 
within the same sector. This adds further support to the differing in-
teractions between market participants and the manner in which in-
formation flows between markets, validating the final, fifth hypothesis 
that there exists substantial decoupling of broad sectoral indices with 
the airlines that have experienced substantial tragedy. 
5. Concluding comments 
In this paper, we investigate as to whether a number of stylised facts 
relating to the effects of airline disasters on aviation stocks and con-
tagion effects within the broad sector hold. Using a number of 
exceptionally detailed databases, we investigate as to whether there 
exist time-varying and geographical differences in the response me-
chanisms of investors to aviation disasters, or indeed, has there been a 
variation of response that could be considered to be correlated to the 
level of injury and fatality caused by each individual incident. Further, 
we generate further novelty through the inclusion of analysis that fo-
cused on the interlinkages between the incident companies and the 
broad aviation sector, and indeed the flow of information and price 
discovery that could be considered to be abnormal when considering 
pre-disaster averages. 
We first clearly identify that substantially elevated levels of share 
price volatility on average in the periods incorporating 1995 through 
2019, however, there is evidence to suggest that this volatility has 
somewhat decreased in the periods 2005 through 2019. This indicates 
that while share price volatility increases while price falls remain 
substantial, their effects have fallen over time. Further, such effects are 
found to be substantial when considering geographical differentials, 
with both North American and South American companies exhibiting 
the largest negative effects. When analysing cumulative abnormal re-
turns, we observe that there exist sharp under-performance of the 
companies relative to international exchanges throughout each of the 
analysed time periods with the exception of the period between 2000 
and 2004. There is further evidence that CARs do not appear to behave 
in a similar manner depending on the market in which the airline stock 
is traded. South American airlines presented evidence of substantial 
Fig. 9. Dynamic conditional correlations with aviation sector by region due to airline disasters. 
Note: The above figure presents the dynamic conditional correlations with the aviation sector by region over time due to airline disasters. The average results for sixty 
days both before and after each incident for presentation purposes. 
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under-performance when compared to international averages in the 
period before airline crashes leading to fatality, whereas, African, 
European and North American airlines were identified to largely out-
perform broad markets by more than 10%, but in the period thereafter, 
under-performed the same indices by between 6% and 10%. When 
considering our EGARCH analysis, we observe that there are a large 
number of companies that experience a sharp increase in unconditional 
volatility in the ten-day period both before and after the aviation in-
cident, indicative of strong short-term effects. However, such effects are 
found to dissipate in the following windows of investigation, based on 
twenty-day, forty-day and sixty-day windows respectively. Such results 
indicate that while the shock to unconditional volatility appears to be 
immediate, there is evidence to suggest that it dissipates and returns to 
pre-aviation incident levels within sixty days after the event. Further, 
our results indicate that there exists a clear positive relationship be-
tween the two variables, indicating that the estimated EGARCH-vola-
tility appears to be significantly influenced by the scale of the disaster 
in terms of the fatalities generated. Within this context, our research 
finds that there exist regional and time-varying effects both in terms of 
volatility and share price response. Further, such share price volatility 
is found to be directly responsive to the severity of each incident. This 
can perhaps be explained by the presence of improved information 
flows through financial markets in the later years analysed within the 
sample period. 
Further, when considering the contagion effects of volatility and the 
flow of information and price discovery between the incident company 
and the broad aviation sector, we find that there were substantial de-
creased in dynamic conditional correlations during incidents that 
occurred in the periods 1995–99, 2000–04 and 2005–09 respectively. 
However,evidence of such pronounced effects do not appear to occur in 
the periods between 2010 and 14 and 2015–19. Further, crashes in 
Africa are found to have little of substantial change in the period after, 
there are substantial changes in dynamic conditional correlation ob-
served for incidents that have occurred in Asia, Europe, and both North 
and South America respectively. Further, for every case analysed we 
find that there were substantial decreases in information flow identified 
between the interactions between both the airline and the aviation 
sector. This indicates that there is a permanent disruption to the flow of 
information and price discovery channels that would have traditional 
have existed in the period prior to the aviation disaster. That is, while 
companies attempt to return to any form of perceived normality in the 
period after an aviation disaster, investors appear to treat such com-
panies in a different capacity to industrial peers on a permanent basis. It 
would be quite interesting for future research to investigate as to 
whether similar effects area found to permeate throughout the entire 
supply chain relating to goods an services that are provided to the 
aviation industry. 
Our research has a series of relevant policy implications. Market 
sensitivity to such sudden, catastrophic shocks such as those related to 
aviation disasters can of course be considered to be exceptionally ne-
gative with regards to expected investor response. However, there has 
been considerable reservations about the implicit role that social media 
and the spread of misinformation, or malicious information can have in 
the aftermath of such events. Much of the spread of such information 
usually surrounds speculation based on the cause and responsibility 
attributed to the incident. We feel that analysis and policy review 
Table 5 
Number(percentage) of companies experiencing an increase in their stock returns' dynamic correlation with aviation index in the short and long-run after their 








Panel A: Positive dummy coefficient 
003490.KS 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 
2610.TW 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 3 (100) 3 (100) 
AC.TO 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 0 (0) 
AIRA.KL 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 0 (0) 
AIRF.PA 1 (20) 1 (20) 1 (20) 1 (20) 1 (20) 1 (20) 4 (80) 
ALK 0 (0) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 
BA 2 (50) 2 (50) 1 (25) 1 (25) 2 (50) 1 (25) 4 (100) 
LTM.SN 2 (50) 2 (50) 2 (50) 2 (50) 2 (50) 2 (50) 4 (100) 
LUV 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 0 (0) 
MASM 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 
PIAa.KA 3 (50) 4 (66.67) 3 (50) 3 (50) 2 (33.33) 3 (50) 6 (100) 
SAS.ST 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (50) 1 (50) 1 (50) 
SEBF.PA 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 
THYAO.IS 3 (50) 3 (50) 3 (50) 3 (50) 3 (50) 3 (50) 6 (100) 
UAL.O 2 (50) 2 (50) 3 (75) 2 (50) 2 (50) 3 (75) 0 (0) 
ALL 25 (37.31) 27 (40.3) 27 (40.3) 26 (38.81) 25 (37.31) 27 (40.3) 42 (62.69)  
Panel B: Significant positive dummy coefficient 
2610.TW 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (33.33) 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 0 (0) 3 (100) 
600,029.SS 0 (0) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 0 (0) 1 (100) 
AIRF.PA 0 (0) 1 (20) 1 (20) 1 (20) 1 (20) 1 (20) 4 (80) 
BA 0 (0) 1 (25) 1 (25) 1 (25) 2 (50) 1 (25) 4 (100) 
DAL 1 (50) 1 (50) 1 (50) 0 (0) 1 (50) 1 (50) 0 (0) 
LTM.SN 0 (0) 2 (50) 2 (50) 2 (50) 2 (50) 2 (50) 3 (75) 
LUV 0 (0) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100) 0 (0) 
MASM 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 1 (33.33) 
PIAa.KA 0 (0) 2 (33.33) 1 (16.67) 1 (16.67) 1 (16.67) 2 (33.33) 5 (83.33) 
THYAO.IS 0 (0) 1 (16.67) 3 (50) 3 (50) 3 (50) 3 (50) 6 (100) 
UAL.O 0 (0) 1 (25) 0 (0) 2 (50) 1 (25) 2 (50) 0 (0) 
ALL 1 (1.49) 12 (17.91) 14 (20.9) 18 (26.87) 16 (23.88) 16 (23.88) 40 (59.7) 
Note: For brevity, only significant and results above zero are presented. Panel A (Panel B) presents the statistical results on the (significant) positive dummy 
coefficients estimated in the following regression ρi, avi
t = α + Dt + εt. ρ
t denotes the dynamic conditional correlations, i stands for the selected company's returns, avi 
is the returns of the benchmark index where … Dt is a dummy variable that takes the value one for a certain period of time after company announcements. Values in 
this table show the number of companies that experience a change in their stock returns' correlation between the above mentioned indices after their announcements. 
The column headers show the number of days that we analyse the correlation change after the announcements. The values in the parentheses are the percentage of 
companies within the sub-groups experiencing a change in correlations.  
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Table 6 
Price Discovery differentials between aviation companies and the entire sector both before and after aviation disasters.              
Event ID IS pre CS pre ILS pre Lags IS post CS post ILS post ΔIS ΔIS-r ΔCS ΔILS   
1  0.7071  0.9634  0.9715  5  0.5917  0.9750  0.9719  7  −0.1154  0.0116  0.0004  
0.2929  0.0366  0.0285   0.4083  0.0250  0.0281      
2  0.9002  0.9181  0.9587  4  0.6159  0.5148  0.9667  85  −0.2843  −0.4033  0.0080  
0.0998  0.0819  0.0413   0.3841  0.4852  0.0333      
3  0.9711  0.8329  0.9737  4  0.9128  0.6296  0.9377  90  −0.0583  −0.2033  −0.0360  
0.0289  0.1671  0.0263   0.0872  0.3704  0.0623      
4  0.7875  0.9750  0.9676  2  0.5974  0.5835  0.9719  7  −0.1901  −0.3915  0.0043  
0.2125  0.0250  0.0324   0.4026  0.4165  0.0281      
6  0.9178  0.9747  0.9735  2  0.6136  0.9439  0.9572  5  −0.3041  −0.0308  −0.0163  
0.0822  0.0253  0.0265   0.3864  0.0561  0.0428      
7  0.8740  0.9650  0.9729  2  0.5678  0.9744  0.9718  7  −0.3062  0.0094  −0.0011  
0.1260  0.0350  0.0271   0.4322  0.0256  0.0282      
8  0.9741  0.8921  0.9748  2  0.6230  0.9473  0.9560  5  −0.3511  0.0552  −0.0188  
0.0259  0.1079  0.0252   0.3770  0.0527  0.0440      
9  0.9460  0.9146  0.9739  2  0.5840  0.9749  0.9718  7  −0.3620  0.0603  −0.0020  
0.0540  0.0854  0.0261   0.4160  0.0251  0.0282      
11  0.9439  0.8982  0.9565  4  0.5846  0.8982  0.9666  85  −0.3593  0.0000  0.0101  
0.0561  0.1018  0.0435   0.4154  0.1018  0.0334      
14  0.9432  0.8564  0.9566  4  0.5105  0.5563  0.9657  85  −0.4327  −0.3001  0.0091  
0.0568  0.1436  0.0434   0.4895  0.4437  0.0343      
15  0.9214  0.9352  0.9391  4  0.4914  0.8192  0.9225  90  −0.4300  −0.1160  −0.0166  
0.0786  0.0648  0.0609   0.5086  0.1808  0.0775      
16  0.9244  0.8358  0.9396  4  0.6597  0.8142  0.9517  90  −0.2647  −0.0215  0.0121  
0.0756  0.1642  0.0604   0.3403  0.1858  0.0483      
17  0.9229  0.8625  0.9394  4  0.6215  0.8167  0.9477  90  −0.3014  −0.0458  0.0083  
0.0771  0.1375  0.0606   0.3785  0.1833  0.0523      
18  0.9273  0.9596  0.9401  4  0.5963  0.8093  0.9651  90  −0.3310  −0.1503  0.0250  
0.0727  0.0404  0.0599   0.4037  0.1907  0.0349      
21  0.9615  0.9668  0.9741  3  0.6238  0.9483  0.9558  5  −0.3377  −0.0186  −0.0184  
0.0385  0.0332  0.0259   0.3762  0.0517  0.0442      
22  0.9288  0.8067  0.9403  3  0.8226  0.6339  0.9573  90  −0.1062  −0.1728  0.0170  
0.0712  0.1933  0.0597   0.1774  0.3661  0.0427      
23  0.9274  0.8093  0.9401  3  0.7307  0.7390  0.9595  90  −0.1967  −0.0703  0.0195  
0.0726  0.1907  0.0599   0.2693  0.2610  0.0405      
24  0.9284  0.8076  0.9402  3  0.7333  0.7374  0.9595  90  −0.1951  −0.0701  0.0193  
0.0716  0.1924  0.0598   0.2667  0.2626  0.0405      
25  0.9265  0.8108  0.9399  3  0.6434  0.8159  0.9612  90  −0.2831  0.0051  0.0213  
0.0735  0.1892  0.0601   0.3566  0.1841  0.0388      
32  0.8134  0.7685  0.9733  2  0.5560  0.1794  0.9735  15  −0.2575  −0.5891  0.0002  
0.1866  0.2315  0.0267   0.4440  0.8206  0.0265      
36  0.9728  0.9737  0.9616  2  0.6254  0.8041  0.9720  7  −0.3474  −0.1697  0.0104  
0.0272  0.0263  0.0384   0.3746  0.1959  0.0280      
37  0.9420  0.7798  0.9424  3  0.8193  0.7798  0.9691  90  −0.1227  0.0000  0.0267  
0.0580  0.2202  0.0576   0.1807  0.2202  0.0309      
38  0.9434  0.7770  0.9426  3  0.7052  0.7250  0.9610  90  −0.2382  −0.0521  0.0184  
0.0566  0.2230  0.0574   0.2948  0.2750  0.0390      
46  0.9381  0.9854  0.9417  64  0.5591  0.9728  0.7368  90  −0.3790  −0.0125  −0.2049  
0.0619  0.0146  0.0583   0.4409  0.0272  0.2632      
48  0.9716  0.9725  0.9744  70  0.6099  0.9423  0.9577  5  −0.3617  −0.0302  −0.0167  
0.0284  0.0275  0.0256   0.3901  0.0577  0.0423      
49  0.9675  0.9731  0.9636  75  0.5510  0.7525  0.9717  7  −0.4165  −0.2206  0.0081  
0.0325  0.0269  0.0364   0.4490  0.2475  0.0283      
52  0.9301  0.9604  0.9405  85  0.5494  0.9604  0.8984  90  −0.3807  0.0000  −0.0420  
0.0699  0.0396  0.0595   0.4506  0.0396  0.1016      
54  0.9368  0.7322  0.9415  92  0.7852  0.7322  0.9578  90  −0.1516  0.0000  0.0163  
0.0632  0.2678  0.0585   0.2148  0.2678  0.0422      
55  0.9376  0.9145  0.9416  92  0.5050  0.9145  0.9616  90  −0.4326  0.0000  0.0200  
0.0624  0.0855  0.0584   0.4950  0.0855  0.0384      
56  0.9620  0.9451  0.9331  92  0.6174  0.9396  0.9568  5  −0.3446  −0.0054  0.0237  
0.0380  0.0549  0.0669   0.3826  0.0604  0.0432      
57  0.9371  0.9537  0.9416  92  0.5059  0.9537  0.9612  90  −0.4312  0.0000  0.0196  
0.0629  0.0463  0.0584   0.4941  0.0463  0.0388      
58  0.9451  0.9109  0.9615  92  0.8256  0.7708  0.9711  8  −0.1194  −0.1401  0.0096  
0.0549  0.0891  0.0385   0.1744  0.2292  0.0289      
60  0.8416  0.9606  0.9720  92  0.5497  0.9731  0.9717  7  −0.2919  0.0125  −0.0003  
0.1584  0.0394  0.0280   0.4503  0.0269  0.0283      
61  0.9726  0.9743  0.9503  89  0.8492  0.5982  0.9603  85  −0.1234  −0.3761  0.0101  
0.0274  0.0257  0.0497   0.1508  0.4018  0.0397      
64  0.7523  0.9694  0.9720  2  0.5776  0.9748  0.9718  7  −0.1747  0.0054  −0.0002  
0.2477  0.0306  0.0280   0.4224  0.0252  0.0282     
Note: The above panel represents the estimated coefficients of price discovery. For brevity, only significant and results above zero are presented. IS represents the 
information share, IS-r represents the reverse information share criterion, CS represents the component share of information while ILS represent the information 
leadership share of information. The four right-hand columns represent the estimated changes in price discovery in the periods both before and after the an-
nouncements of name changing processes.  
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surrounding high-frequency financial market data paired with that of 
social media data would be considered a worthy direction of future 
research. While our research presents evidence that financial markets 
are guided by better quality information through the development of 
social media, it should also be considered that the presence of such 
improved efficiency could in fact manifest in side-effects such as an 
ability to profit from the spread of false information, not only gen-
erating further undue distress on the companies and families involved 
in such tragedy, but also hindering the efforts of rescue teams while 
further inspiring other market participants who do not fear current 
regulatory and policing efforts. 
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